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The rapid advances in space technology during the first decade
of the space age have depended heavily on the intense rivalry in political
and military affairs of two very wealthy nations. Without that rivalry,
it is doubtful if either the Soviet Union or the United States would have
begun or maintained the remarkable pace of development in capabilities
to launch heavier and more complex payloads into space that has characterized
the first decade of space activities.
The rapid developments, and the political attention devoted to the
space race, have also served to increase interest in national space activities
in countries other than the United States and the Soviet Union, particularly
other major industrial nations. However, these industrial nations, lacking
sufficient resources, have found that the space age has presented them,
with new and vexing issues involving not only the establishment of sensible
space objectives, but also the question of their fundamental ability to
stay abreast of the two superpowers in modern technology. They have in
their grasp some, but not all, of the technical_ industrial, and financial
resources needed to undertake space programs comparable to those of the
superpowers. And they lack the sense of purpose necessary to the creation
of a political consensus that would favor intensive and proportionally
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enormous space efforts. Many of the sec ,_)nd-rank industrial nations therefore
face perplexing decisions regarding both the advisability, and the means,
of remaining in the front ranks of technology. For these nations, the first
decade of the space age--with its widening disparity in technological prowess
between themselves and the supe:pcwers--has precipitated a crisis of identity,
one manifestation of which has been the heated controversy over the "technology
gap" between the United States and nations of Western Europe and, to a lesser
extent, Japan.
To the non..ndustrial countries of the developing world, the space
achievements of the United States and Soviet Union may be, in the long run,
even more significant and disturbing. If these achievements add to the
sense of separation, discrimination, and frustration felt in much of the
developing world, or if they serve to advance the military capabilities of
the developing countries rather than their economic growth, it seems very
likely that the present technological controversy among the industrial
nations will be laid to rest long before a solution is found to the problem
of narrowing the gap with the less developed world.
More generally, the spread and continued advance of space technology
will raise urgent issues related to questions of international control,
regulation, and settlement of disputes. These are subjects that are likely
to cause political problems but also offer opportunities to develop inter-
national machinery and international law that can serve to enhance peace and
security.
Thus, the rate at which space technology spreads throughout the world,
the uses to which it is put, the developments in other fields that it may
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pre-empt, and the international political machinery growing up around space
technology, are subjects of vital importance to future international relations.
in this chapter, the spread of space technology is considered first as
it relates to the major industrial countries, and second in relation to
the nonindustrial world. It is also important to distinguish at the outset
between two kinds of spread. The first is the sp ead of more or less inde-
pendent capabilities by nations or groups of rations to mount space activities.
The second is a sort of induced spread, fostered by the spacefaring nations
to promote cooperative programs which are primarily dependent on the tech-
nology of the donor, or to apply the donor's space technology directly or
indirectly to the requirements of another nation.
Space Programs in the Industrial Countries
Apart from the United States and Soviet Union, the independent capa-
bility to engage in space activities resides mainly in five countries. In
Western Europe, Britain, France, and Germany have important capabilities.
In Asia, Japan and, to an unknown degree, Communist China, have similar
qualifications. In order to consider the capabilities of these nations in
their proper perspective, it is important to remember that their expenditures
on space activity have been only a small fraction of the amount being spent
by the United States and, presumably, the Soviet Union. 	 Especially with
In 1966, France had a scheduled expenditure of $73 million on space,
Germany $60 million, Britain $47 million, and Japan $12.5 million, in
comparison with approximately $6,000 million in the United States.
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regard to Western. Europa, it is not difficult to be misled by a confusing
array of proposals and design studies to the conclusion that rapid progress
in s pace technology is being made. In fact, however, the multiplicity of
space programs proposed for the late 1960's and 1970's really indicates a
need for a more unified sense of direction in European space activities.
As one eminent British scientist has observed:
Thus Western Europe enters the second decade of space
flight still with no clear idea of her eventual destination
in space or even of the initial route that must be followed.
The simple purpose of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. to explore the
Moon and planets both with manned and unmanned spacecraft
(which is the most powerful reason for a space program) is
missing. It is too expensive for Europe to contemplate, at
least in the next 10 years, and important subsidiary objec-
tives must therefore be found.*
But the identification of subsidiary or any other objectives, and
their systematic pursuit, require agreement and common enterprise, preferably
under the direction of a single authority. Western Europe has consistently
been tantalized by the possibilities available to it if its technical and
economic resources could be aggregated. As the following table illustrates,
the combined resources would be very impressive, enabling Europe to under-
take space programs which could be competitive with the two superpowers.
(The table also indicates, however, that in the mid-1960's, in proportion
to GNP Western Europe was making about one-twentieth the allocation to space
being made by the United States, and about one-fortieth that of the Soviet
Union.) This awareness of potential strength has led to the initiation of
several joint ventures, such as the European Launcher Development Organization
*
L. R. Shepherd, "The First Decade of . Space Flight on the European Scene,"
Aeronautics & Astronautics, October, 1967, pp. 62-68.
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United States Western Europe* USSR
(1965-66) (1964-65)
Gross National Product (GNP)
(millions of dollars) 639,000 429,000 287,000
Population (millions) 192 289 225
GNP per capi-a (dollars) 3,330 1,485 1,275
Part of GNP devoted to research and
development (per cent) 3.1 1.4 2.8
	 (1962)
Space budget
(millions of dollars) 6,650 210 6,000(est.)
Part of GNP devoted to space
(per cent) 1.05 0.05 2(est.)
*
Includes Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
SOURCE: Centre Nationale d'Etudes Spatiales, L a Recherche Spatiale, Vol. VI,
No. 6(June-July, 1967), p. 16.
(ELDO), the European Space Research Organization (ESRO), and the industrial
consortium EUROSPACE. Unfortunately, these combined efforts have consistently
been impeded by the hard political realities of conflicting national interests
and objectives, as well as rivalries within the combined structure. These
impediments have been reflected in delays, excessive costs, and the constant
threat of cancellations. Therefore, independent national space programs,
necessarily smaller in scale, have never been completely abandoned in Western
Europe and may yet become a more important element in European space planning.
The figures provided in the table fortify the commonly accepted estimate
that, even in the unlikely event that some of the other industrial powers
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as Britain, France, West Germany, and Japan were to increase their space
expenditures drastically--for example, to about one-half of 1 per cent
of GNP per year--the United States and the Soviet Union would still remain
the predominant space powers by any standard of measurement.. But this kind
of assertion, although factual, may also be somewhat misleading. It is
important to keep in mind that the two superpowers have made an extremely
large investment in both unmanned and manned space exploration, but have
concentrated resour,es in support of a manned lunar landing. (In fiscal
1966, for example, the Apollo program alone accounted for about 60 per
cent of NASA's total $5.2 billion budget.) If the cost of a manned lunar
program or other highly ambitious programs of manned space exploration were
omitted, then smaller budgets of other countries would appear more compet-
itive, especially in the practical application of artificial earth satel-
lites.
It is worth while to review briefly some of the trends in booster
development by the various industrial nations or international consortia.
These summaries are not meant to be complete, but merely to illustrate the
kinds of programs that have been undertaken or considered.
ELDO
In addition to Britain, France, and Germany, four other nations are
also members of ELDO: Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Australia. The
ELDO concept was proposed by Britain in 1960. Although a "Convention
Establishing a European Organization for the Development and Construction
of Space Vehicle Launchers" was signed by the seven nations on March 29, 1962,
a_
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the convention did not actually become effective until 1964, and costly
delays were therefore encountered from the beginning. The convention
states that:
(1) The Organization will have as its aim the development and con-
struction of space-vehicle launchers and their equipment suitable
for practical applications and for supply to eventual users.
(2) The Organization shall concern itself only with peaceful applica-
tions of Fuch launchers and equipment.
The convention also provides that "each Member State which has contri-
buted to the cost of a program of the Organization shall have the right
to procure, for any peaceful purpos- of its cwn, the launchers a0 equip-
ment ,jointly developed under such program or oiy part thereof." k;The
term "peaceful" in these statements is understood to mean "nonmilitary.")
ELDO has been developing the following launchers:
ELDO-A, or Europa I. This is a three-stage vehicle of which the first
stage is British (Blue Streak), the second stage is French (Coralie), and
the third stage is German. The vehicle was designed to launch 2,300 pounds
into a near-earth circular orbit.
ELDO-PAS (Perigee-Apogee System). This is an ELDO-A, supplemented by
perigee and apogee motors and inertial guidance, intended to be capable of
placing communications satellites weighing 300 pounds or more in geostationary
orbits at an altitude of about 23,000 miles. The ELDO-PAS is scheduled
to be operational in about 1970.
In addition, there have been several studies of improved ELDO launchers
that could be operational in the 1970'x, but it is far from certain, for
reasons discussed later, that they will actually come into being. The main
studies are concerned with the ELDO-B-1, with an improved second stage which
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would be capable of placing a 4,000-pound payload into a 220-nautical-
mile polar orbit and, with the addition of a satellite apogee motor, of
placing up to 1,100 pounds in a geostationary orbit. The second important
possible launcher would be ELDO-B-2, with upgraded second and third stages,
capable of placing 6,700 pounds into e 220-nautical-mile polar orbit or up
to 4,400 pounds in a geostationary orbit. Developments of this magnitude,
however, would depend on common agreement within Europe and on a single
relatively powerful space authority, strongly backed by all the partici-
pating governments. There is little reason to believe that any of these
preconditions are likely to exist until well into the 1970's at least.
France
Since 1958, France has been developing and producing long-range
misiies as part of its strategic force de dissuasion. Taking advantage
of this military effcrt, France also initiated a space program and in
1965 became the third nation to place a satellite in orbit. A question
of special importance to France in laying the groundwork for national or
European space ventures of the future is the availability of larger boost
vehicles. Out of the French intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM)
program came the present French boost vehicle, the Diamant, which has
launched all but one of France's early satellites.	 (One French satellite,
SEREB (Societe pour 1'ftude et Realisation d'Engins Balistiques), which
directs the French IRBM effort, devised a plan in 1960 for developing a
satellite booster based on research rockets used in the IRBM program.
Three of these research vehicles, fineraude, Topaze, and Agate were used as
the stages of the Diamant booster. In November, 1965, France became the
third nation to orbit a satellite by means of an indigenously developed
launch vehicle.
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the FR-1, was launched by a U.S. Scout rocket.) The Diamant is a three-
stage vehicle based on research rockets which were developed for the inter-
mediate-range missile program. It is roughly comparable in performance to
the U.S. Scout rocket. Therefore, although it is useful as a relatively
inexpensive vehicle for launching small spa^ecraft, it is not large enough
to support an ambitious national space effort.
The ELDO consortium has therefore been especially important to Fiance
because it provides access to large boosters at an acceptable cost at a
time when France is heavily obligated in its military effort. Thus France
has supported continuation of the ELDO project, and has placed options to
purchase two ELDO vehicles for the launching--in about 1970--of the proposed
joint Franco-German Symphonie communications satellite, a field in which
France has a particularly strong interest.
At the same time, the French Government also authorized the development
of an improved national booster, the Diamant B which, although considerably
smaller than the ELDO boosters, is also less expensive and can be used as
a work-horse vehicle for the national space effort.* The Diamant B, scheduled
to make its first flight from the French Guiana range in 1969 or 1970, will
be capable of placing 200- to 300-pound payloads in relatively low orbits.
French space planners have generated a variety of proposals for inde-
pendent or strictly European satellite communications networks,but it is difficult to
*
The Diamant B will generate 79,000 pounds of first-stage shrust, compared
with Eldo's first-stage thrust of more than 300,000 pounds.
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predict which of them may come into being. There are special French
interests in satellite links between France and its former African colonies,
as well as the Middle East and Latin America, but many uncertainties still
surround these proposals. In addition, France has also shown a strong
interest in the military uses of space--especially i:. navigation, geodesy,
meteorology, and other types of satellites to enhance the effectiveness
of its strategic missile force.
In addition to its membership in joint European space organizations
such as ELDO, ESRO, EUROSPACE, and the Conference on Satellite Communications
(CETS), France has engaged in a number of civilian space exchanges and joint
operations with the United States, including two satellite projects, several
sounding-rocket programs, ground-based cooperative experiments, and personnel
exchanges. With the Soviet Union, France holds an agreement for cooperation
in color-television broadcasting involving the employment of the French
SECAM television system in conjunction with the Soviet Molniya satellite.
In addition, France and the U.S.S.R. cooperate in the launching of sounding
rockets from the Indian launch site at Thumba. There have also been discussions
about the use of Soviet boosters to enable France to launch larger satellites,
such as the 660-pound Roseau.
The French civilian space budget for 1966 stood at $72.9 million, less
than one-tenth of 1 per cent of GNP. Of this amount, roughly two-thirds was
allocated to the national space program and the remainder to the joint
European programs ELDO and ESRO, in marked contrast with Britain, which has
allocated about two-thirds of its space effort to international programs.
The French space budget was expected to increase considerably during the late
1960's.
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United Kingdom
Britain has been the largest single contributor to ELDO, both finan-
cially and technically. It has provided about 38 per cent of ELDO funding,
and the availability of the already developed Blue Streak as the first-
stage booster for the ELDO vehicle has undoubtedly been the largest single
technical contribution to the project.
The technical element which still sets the British space program
apart from the other European countries is the Blue Streak booster, which
generates about 300,000 pounds of thrust. In the mid-1950's Britain
developed, with U.S. technical assistance, the Blue Streak intermediate-
range ballistic missile. The thrust unit was built by Rolls-Royce under
license from Rocketdyne in the United States, and Hawker Siddeley built the
air-frame under license from General Dynamics. By the time that the project
was canceled in 1960 approximately 500 static firings had been made, and
much of the research and development had been completed. In its later role
as the ELDO first stage, it was fired successfully several times from the
Woomera (Australia) launch range. Britain thus has in Blue Streak a rela-
tively large vehicle which has been fully tested and the costs of which, for
the most part, have been absorbed. The consequence of this has been, over
the years, a variety of proposals, particularly from British industry, for
large boosters consisting of Blue Streak as the first stage, with smaller
British boosters such as Black Knight or Black Arrow for the later stages.
It seems likely, however, that whatever advantages accrued to Britain as a
_,	 y
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result of the availability of these boosters at the beginning of the 1960's
will end with the passage of time and developments in other countries.
In Britain, as in France, there also has appeared a strong interest
in the development of a smaller national satellite booster to complement
,joint ELDO projects and lay the groundwork for a more advanced national
effort. In Britain this involves the development of the Black Arrow vehicle,
capable of placing about 250 pounds into a 310-mile circular polar orbit
from the Woomera launch site. The Black Arrow, with a first-stage thrust
of about 50,000 pounds, is not a particularly expensive venture because it
is based on the already proven Black Knight vehicle, which was developed
in the 1950's as a re-entry test vehicle for the Blue Streak. The Black
Arrow could, like the Diamant B and Scout, become a small but useful national
"work-horse" booster.
Balancing Britain's strong technical capabilities is, of course, a
generally adverse economic and political environment. Britain's recurrent
economic crises do not appear to favor any marked increase in expenditure for
space activities, and there has been a general lack of public enthusiasm
about national space programs. It seems more likely, therefore, that Britain
will undertake independent efforts sparingly, and continue to cooperate
closely with the United States in major programs, particularly in communi-
cations satellites. Britain, as an international crossroads for trade and
commerce, has been especially aware of the potential value of satellite
communications. It has been an active partner with the United States in the
International Telecommunications Satellite Consortium (Intelsat) effort in
the civilian area and, in the military field, in the Interim Defense C( .:•..ini-
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cations Satellite Program (IDCSP).
West Germany
West German space activity to date has been characterized by highly
ambitious and advanced feasibility studies, balanced by a relatively low
level of development or construction of hardware and systems. For a number
of political and technical reasons, the most important of which are probably
the restrictions and political sensitivities attendant on German national
booster development, plus the lack of suitable national launch sites, the
West German space program has been based primarily on multilateral cooperative
ventures. Of particular importance is the ELDO program, for which West
Germany is supp" . ing the third-stage booster.
Space expenditures of the West German Government have been slowly
increasing but still represent only about one-twentieth of 1 per cent of
GNP. Of the approximately $60 million per year spent by West Germany for
space research and development in the late 1960's, about 60 per cent was
committed to ELDO and ESRO. However, running parallel to pressures within
West Germany for greater military autonomy, there has also been a certain
amount of pressure from the West German scientific and industrial communities
to allocate a much larger share of the total space budget to purely national
efforts. The following trends in the West German space effort are apparent:
(1) the national space effort, in future years, is likely to receive a
larger share of the space budget than it has previously; (2) projects
considered to provide spin-offs of technology to the national industry and
economy will be stressed; (3) there will probably be no attempt to compete
in the construction of large boosters. (This last trend, if followed,
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will tend to limit the German effort to programs which depend on foreign
launch vehicles.)
Government funding is being provided to a number of projects such as:
the expansion of existing test installations and creation of new ones; high-
altitude research rockets, highly advanced conceptual studies on manned
recoverable boosters; and the research and development program for the third
stage of the ELDO boost vehicle.
Although the size of the West German aerospace industry is small in
comparison with Britain and France, there has been a general policy of
maintaining a group of highly talented technical personnel conversant with
the latest aerospace technology, primarily by means of bilateral and multi-
lateral arrangements. West Germany has, therefore, become a sort of inter-
national center for a consideration of advanced aerospace concepts. Although
it seems unlikely that West Germany by itself will initiate any space
programs of major significance by the mid-1970's, it could nevertheless be
a partner, and possibly a catalyst, in many important cooperative arrangements.
West Germany is particularly restricted with respect to launch facilities,
since a site suitable for large rockets is not available on its national
territory. Italy has made the Sardinia range available to Germany for the
launching of research rockets, and the French Guiana range may eventually
be available for German use. Another possible recourse would be a mobile
marine platform of the Italian San Marco type.
Finally, it should be noted that the West German GNP is the third
largest in the world and is growing rapidly. In spite of present political,
geographic, and technical limitations, the German space effort could, perhaps
..
a	 -.
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beginning in the late 1970's, become a far !nore influential element than
it is today.
Japan
The leading industrial nation of the Far East, Japan also has one of
the highest economic growth rates in the world. In space, as in many
other fields of industry and technology, Japan has shown remarkable progress
in the last decade. Although it is difficult to estimate Japan's future
course in space, planning in the late 1960's calls for an orderly and
ambitioup program of about two scientific satellite launches per year.
Since the mid-1950's, Japanese scientists, particularly those at the
University of Tokyo, have succeeded in conducting a program to develop large
solid-fuel rockets on the basis of an extremely small budget and a minimum
of formal organization. From the outset of the effort at the University
of Tokyo in 1955, the Japanese rocket program has been based on solid fuels.
With the exception of one of the four stages of the Mu-4 rockets, all of
the launchings in the University of Tokyo series have used solid-propellant
boosters. The Japanese Science and Technology Agency, which will in future
direct the main Japanese efforts in rocket development, is also planning to
use solid-fuel vehicles.
The most important programs in the recent past were in the Greek-letter
series of sounding rockets developed by the University of Tokyo, notably
the Kappa, Lambda, and Mu rockets. The first launch in the Kappa series
took place in October, 1956, after which successively larger vehicles were
developed at intervals of one to two years. The Kappa-8 rocket, launched
Wawa
*x
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in 1960, was able to lift a payload of 77 pounds to an altitude of 123
miles. In late 1963, the Lambda-2 rocket, a two-stage booster 53 feet
long, lifted a payload of 405 pounds to an altitude of 255 miles. In
July, 1964, the Lambda-3 three-stage rocket raised a payload of 308 pounds
to an altitude of 620 miles. The program culminated in the development
of the Mu-4 vehicle. The first stage of this rocket made a successful
unguided flight test in October, 1966. It was scheduled in 1967 or 1968
to put a 154-pound payload into orbit.
The Japanese Government has a strong interest in satellite appli-
cations, as evidenced by plans being developed not only in the Science and
Technology Agency, but also in the Ministry of Education, the Meteorology
Agency, and other sections of the government. If present planning is
implemented, Japan will place its own geostationary communications satellite
in orbit by 1973. Although the press and public will probably continue
to oppose any programs with military overtones, there appears to be general
suppc.rt for satellite applications for commercial and economic purposes.
Furthermore, Japan has very strong technical and economic capabilities to
support a much larger effort.
In the past, Japanese rocket specialists, particularly the group at
the University of Tokyo directed by Dr. Hideo Itokawa, were able to make
great strides in the construction and launching of sounding rockets with
a very small budget and without the necessity of technical assistance from
abroad. However, the several failures of the University of Tokyo team in
1966 and 1967 to launch small, 57-pound satellites into orbit may indicate
that a point has been reached in Japanese rocketry at which larger expenditures
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and the importing of foreign technology will be necessary to obtain the
larger goals that have been specified. This may, in part, explain the
creation of the Science and Technology agency, which with its potentially
closer ties to Japanese industry could undertake space activities on a
larger scale. It also helps to explain the increasing concern in Japan
about the level of expenditure on research and development and the emergence
of the "technology gap" as an issue in Japan as well as in Western Europe.
Communist China
Although the launching by Communist China of a small satellite seemed
an imminent probability in the late 1960's, it was equally clear, from
available economic indicators, that it was not on the verge of becoming a
major spacefaring nation unless it was prepared to curtail somewhat its
intensive military procurement. The launching of a satellite offers to an
ambitious but secretive hierarchy a way of demonstrating its technical
prowess without the need for direct foreign intrusion. The size and
characteristics of the satellite are less important than the mere fact of
the launching. It seems likely that the most sophisticated applications of
space technology in the 1970's will not be made in Communist China but in
Japan. Nevertheless, it is entirely possible that future Asian space
activity will have its own special bipolarity between Communist China and
Japan, and perhaps some of the same characteristics of rivalry earlier seen
between the United States and the Soviet Union.
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SPACE TECHNOLOGY IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD
Some of the more advanced developing countries were, in the late
1960'x, beginning to engage in space activities using technology imported
from the United States, the Su • iet Union, and Western Europe. Typical of
this group are India, Israel, Argentina, Brazil, and Pakistan. Most of
these countries are developing national facilities at which sounding ockets,
either supplied from abroad or developed indigenously with foreign help,
are being launched. In addition, scientific research and experimentation
are in progress, and the interest in development of future space capabilities
is great. None of these countries is likely to be a major factor in space
activity before the end of the 1970's, but it is worth noting that this
class of nation is continuing to press hard in the development of sounding
rockets.
There is inescapable military significance in the diffusion of rocket
technology to this group of more advanced developing countries. Two recent
examples are Israel and India. Early in 1966, it was confirmed that French
aerespace companies were cooperating in research in Israel which -involved
the transfer of data on the Topaze research rocket developed by the French
SEREB consortium. There were indications in the press that the project
might be as much military as civilian in nature. It is obviously very
difficult to draw distinctions in cases of this kind between military and
civilian cooperation. Under the umbrella of civilian arrangements for the
exchange of personnel and scientific data, it becomes considerably easier
to shield military-related transfers of technology from the direct glare
of publicity. As the Israeli case suggests, civilian agreements can, under
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some circumstances, permit missile specialists of different countries to talk
with one another, transfer data, or even carry out development and test
programs. Even when the programs have no covert military purposes, they
may still serve to advance military capabilities to some degree.
Similariy, the Indian Department of Atomic Energy and the French
National Space Agency (CNES) entered an agreement in 1964 under which India
began the licensed production of French Centaure solid-propellant sounding
rockets. By 1967, India had set up facilities to produce the air-frames,
propellant, and electronic systems of this rocket. Partially on the basis
of French support, the Indian government in 1965 approved in principle a
project to build an all-Indian rocket. The possibility certainly exists
that this type of activity may provide the means by which indigenous personnel
can gain experience which may ultimately be useful in the development and
manufacture of ballistic missiles.
The chart that follows depicts an estimate of how rapidly independent
national space capabilities may be created. The sharpest rise i§ likely
to be in the field of sounding rockets, which will also have the greatest
military significance because of the close relationship between sounding
rocket and missile technology. It is pOS I .b_e that 4s the suppliers of
sounding rockets--including both hardware -nd technology--proliferate in
future years, the development of ballistic missiles of moderate range will
become more feasible in the developing world. The majority of sounding
rockets exported to date have little or no direct military application. The
Japanese Kappa-8 rocket, for example, would be capable of lifting only a 77-
pound payload a relatively short distance. The inertially-guided French
_,.
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Topaze, on the other hand, in its present configuration, could probably
deliver a 1,200-pound warhead over a range of about 100 nautical miles.
In spite of this one important negative feature, there is no question
whatever that Space technology can offer important benefits to the developing
countries through suet-, direct applications as earth-resources observation,
geodesy, meteorology and--perhaps most important of all--communications.
But these applications will have to be made primarily through the programs
of existing spacefaring nations, because they are obviously beyond the means
of the developing world.
INDEPENDENT CAPABILITIES FOR SPACE ACTIVITY
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The U.S. Government has been particularly sensitive to the problem
of missile-related transfers of technology and hardware. In cases where
it has supplied sounding rockets to some of the more advanced developing
countries, the launches normally have been supervised by American personnel,
and the main responsibility of local personnel has been in the design and
utilization of the payload. In several of the developing countries, NASA
operates ground stations of various types. Although local personnel are
invited to apply for positions at these stations, there is usually no
opportunity for any technology exchange of real national significance to
the host country. It seems likely, therefore, that the economic and other
nonmilitary benefits of space technology will be felt in the developing
countries mainly through purposeful programs, by the principal spacefaring
nations, to apply those technologies directly or indirectly to specific needs.
IMPLICATIONS
The implications of the spread of space technology are vast. It
would be presumptuous to attempt in this short chapter to catalog all of
them, and only a few specific implications are discussed, some of which
have already been identified in the preceding sections. Although the list
is obviously not a complete one, it should at least serve to illustrate
the importance of the problems and opportunities created by the spread of
space technology.
The Technology Gap and the Spin-off Question.
As noted at the beginning of this chapter, the apparent inability of
the advanced industrial nations of Western ,Europe to keep up with techno-
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logical developments, particularly in space-related fields, is a major
cause of a sense of frustration and apprehension commonly subsumed under
the label of the "technology gap." This gap is hard to define or measure,
but that there is a gap of some kind, and that it is likely to persist well
into the 1970's, appears certain.
One aspect of the gap is the heavy investment in Europe by American
industry, which the Europeans fear will mean ultimate loss of control over
their own economic resources. This may, in fact, be the most serious mani-
festation of imbalances--technical and financial--between Europe and the
United States in the long term. Europeans argue in part that the heavy
investments in defense and space fields in American companies by the U.S.
Government greatly contributes to the financial and technical ability of
these firms to invade European industry.
More immediately related to technology itself and to the future spread
of space technology is the argument that increased investment in space
activities is a way of force-feeding technologies, skills, and management
practices into national economies. This argument stems from the belief,
fostered strongly by the internal U.S. debate over funding for the space
program, that there are important commercial spin-off effects from an
investment in space. The evidence for such spin-off is sparse at best, but
it undoubtedly will play a role in the space policies of many nations.
The "brain-drain" phenomenon is also directly relevant, for no nation
can accept as a permanent phenomenon the emigration of substantial numbers
of its best scientists and engineers eac:^ year. Though both the causes and
the statistics are uncertainly known, the primary reason for the migration
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to the United States appears to be simply that there are greater opportunities
for scientists and engineers in that country. It is usually assumed that
the role played by the space program in creating those opportunities is
obvious. In fact, the reasons go deeper, and seem to be directly related
to the flexible and open relations among universities, government, and
industry, coupled with the substantial government investment in science and
technology as a whole.
All of these factors, when combined with elements of pride and nation-
alism sensitive to a second-class status in one of the endeavors that sets
this century apart from all others, cause considerable anguish to other
nations. Moreover, such factors increase the pressure for the development
of independent, natic_.al space programs. As was the case with atomic energy
in some countries, this pressure, which is likely to become more pronounced
in the future, could in fact lead to the relative neglect of other channels
for investment of resources that are likely to be more economically productive.
For the Europeans to attempt to match the United States in space and atomic
energy would, in effect, be playing to America's strong suit. A much more
fruitful policy would be to challenge the United States in those areas of
technology that it neglects, which are many.
Another noteworthy feature of the Atlantic technological community
closely related to the spread of space technology is its high degree of
technological interdependence. Even in cases where the climate on both sides
of the Atlantic has been cool to technological transfers, such as in techno-
logies related to French ballistic-missile development, the ties are very
strong. Ir the space program, several important production licenses have been
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granted by U.S. companies to France in the fields of materials, tracking
radar, and guidance. An agreement was signed in 1962 between the U.S.
firm Rocketdyne and Sud Aviation under which the technology of wound-
filament glass fiber motor casings was transferred. Vascojet steel has
presumably also been produced in France under U.S. license--to Vanadium
Alloys Steel Company. The missile-tracking stations at the French Colomb-
Bechar and Hammaguir ranges used AME (Angle Aeasuring Equipment) and DME
(Distance Measuring Equipment) constructed by the Compagnie des Compteurs
under license to the U.S. company Cubic Corporation. Under a licensing
agreement with the Kearfott Division of General Precision Inc., the French
organization SAGEM has been producing inertial-guidance instrumentation
such as floated integrating miniaturized gyroscopes and stabilized platforms.
In addition to formal arrangements of this kind, a great deal of
technology is transferred through personal contacts, visits, and publications.
As one French journalist wrote in 1965, "the Americans, whether voluntarily
or not, furnished precious assistance to the French technicians [in] the
difficult and delicate field of all-inertial guidance." 	 Undoubtedly, this
kind of low-level assistance to France and other nations is likely to continue
permanently.
Space Technology for the Developing World.
For the developing countries, the economic payoffs of heavy investments
of their own in space are very questionable. However, there are likely
to be important economic development uses of space systems provided by the
See Judith H. Young, "Th French Strategic Missile Programme," Adelphi Paper
No. 38, The Institute for Strategic Studies, London, July, 1967.
Roger Cabiac, "France: Bon Resultats en Matiere d'Engins et d'Espace, Mais,"
Aviation Magazine International, December 1, 1965, pp. 8-9.
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space powers. Resource mapping, low-cost communications, weather fore-
casting, and educational television programming have already been mentioned.
These capabilities are rudimentary or nonexistent as yet, but may hold
great potential. To make use of these systems, however, will require the
development of indigenous capabilities for research and experimentation
(especially in the educational television area) which in turn would require
extensive technical assistance.
On the military side, there is the important fact that sounding-rocket
and missile technology are closely related. The imperatives of this relation-
ship led the United States for a time to hold back on the sale of small
rockets useful for scientific payloads--such as the Scout--to other nations
that might also develop nuclear weapons. The difficulty and ultimate
futility of such a policy of a total ban on the export of technology have
led to modifications in policy. But even today the United States attempts
to control the end use to which rockets will be put by buyers, and exercises
considerable restraint on the export of information about rocket and rocket-
fuel technology.
In the long run, the United States will probably not be able to prevent
the development of independent rocket technologies applicable for both
peaceful space exploration and for military purposes. Indeed, Britain,
France, Japan, and possibly Communist China have already achieved such inde-
pendent capabilitiej; others such as Germany, Israel, and India have the
potential. For those nations with nuclear aspirations, as well as for those
who already have such weapons, a missile-delivery capability is a requisite
for an effective strike or deterrent force. Thus, if contingent nuclear
ham_	 s.	 a
-26-
options are to be kept open--even amon; nations that have signed the
nuclear nonproliferation treaty--options to obtain delivery systems must
also be kept open. Any nation that might even contemplate some day having
to build nuclear weapons can be expected to engage to some degree in space
programs.
It is also likely that some countries that achieve independent capa-
bilities in booster technology will seek export markets for their hardware
and technology, especially in the developing world, where sounding rockets
may have strategic rather than merely tactical applications. Whether such
it
	 proliferation" can be controlled, regulated, or b.-:nned altogether
is a difficult question. The history to date, in which several countries
were able to develop their own technology with very limited American or
Soviet help, implies that any meaningful control will be exceedingly diffi-
cult without the creation of a powerful international inspection and control
mechanism. ;apan has already in fact exported sounding rockets to Indonesia
and YL;oslavia.
Competition in Commercial Applications.
There are other important present or potential effects in the economic
realm. One is the competition likely to occur in the commercial exploitation
of space. The United States has been the first to capitalize on the commer-
cial potential of communications satellites. Through the ComSat Corporation,
and ComSat's leading role in Intelsat, the United States has assumed a
dominant role in this technology.
But this has met opposition, sometimes bitter, from other countries.
In particular, the French appeared to be anxious to develop alternative
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systems, at the very least to improve their bargaining position for the
negotiations on renewal of the Intelsat agreement in 1969. Accordingly,
France in consequence has been exploring the Symphonie system with West
Germany, as described earlier. Other countries have from time to time
explored the possibility of an independent European communications
satellite system. Canada has expressed an interest in purchasing ELDO
vehicles for launching its domestic comsats, and the availability of the
vehicles after 1970 may be of some importance.
The Soviets already ha,,e an operating domestic system, which presumably
could be extended to international coverage if they decided to challenge
U.S. dominance in this field. The United States has been adamant in holding
that only one communications satellite system is needed or makes economic
sense. But there has been a mounting sense of grievance over the extent
of U.S. dominance and control in this field, and by the late 1960's it
was not at all clear that the United States would be able to continue the
Intelsat monopoly under Comsat dominance. Nor, however, was it clear what
the economic and political significance of competing systems would be.
Another important and commercial effect of the spread of space technology
that began to appear in the late 1960's was the competition for markets for
the supply of component space systems. This international market until then
was dominated by the United States and this seemed likely to continue. But
the Japanese had already made inroads with their excellent and low-cost
technology, and in time others such as France and Germany may do so. If
space programs continue to grow, the market for components will become
substantial, providing an added incentive for those countries able to mount
a meaningful export capability,
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Oligopoly in the field of component technology has a political
meaning: if a major industrial power is in the position of wanting to limit
a space program in another nation, or group of nations, or of threatening
to do so for bargaining purposes, control of the necessary components can
be a useful lever. This may have been the case in the French communications
satellite program because of the latter's dependence on American-made
traveling-wave tubes. Component control is a difficult weapon to use,
however, and could rebound in other areas. The mere fact that the possi-
bility exists, however, doubtless added to the frustration of France and
perhaps others.
The Central Strategic Environinerit.
Finally, there can be little doubt that the late 1960's are witnessing
an increase in the strategic importance of space to the Soviet Union and
the United States. The Soviet Union made it clear, through the public
displays of its missiles in 1965 and 1967, that it intended to maintain
a relatively hostile military space posture, particularly through the
development of suborbital or orbital bombardment systems within the limits
set by the Outer Space Treaty.* The United States is committed by its
policy declarations and treaty obligations to avoid an arms race in space
and to promote arrangements to preserve the peaceful character of space,
within the limits imposed by national security considerations. If the Outer
*
The Treaty does not prohibit, for example, the development, display, or
ground deployment of orbital bombardment systems but only their placement
in orbit.
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Space Treaty is accepted as a worthwhile statement of objectives, then it
seems appropriate to lay the groundwork of international compliance at the
earliest opportunity. Certainly the competence of Western Europe and
Japan could be enlisted for advanced research in space applications useful
for inspection and control of space activities. Example might be in
preliminary design studies and development of concepts for space inspection
vehicles and systems, or in the creation and maintenance of ground space
tracking networks and comsat systems to support an international space
inspectorate.
The Need for International Cooperation and Control.
It would be a mistake to focus only on the problems and dangers inherent
in the increased proliferation of space technology. For such proliferation,
accompanied by the desire of more nations to participate, can also create
opportunities for -.chieving positive and constructive policy goals. The
very functional need for international control and regulation of space
systems to prevent interference, encourage compatibility between systems,
and prevent irresponsible use of space, could lead to the development of
strong new international mechanisms whose importance could extend well beyond
their primary functions. They might contribute to the capability of broader
international peacekeeping agencies for example, or serve in other ways as
devices to strengthen the United Nations and its role in making space
activities more rational.
A general upgrading of space capabilities will also increase the
opportunities for international cooperation in space exploration and in the
applications of space technology for peaceful purposes. Such cooperation
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can have its political rewards in terms of improvement in bilateral relation-
ships or in supporting multilateral groupings.
Many other opportunities for space cooperation remain largely unexplored.
In particular, possibilities for multilateral cooperation under U.N. supervision
or even management have been scarcely touched. Such cooperation is not
without its costs, as the exLerience in ELDO can bear witness.
But other examples of cooperation, such as ESRO and the high-energy
physics laboratory at CERN, have been much more successful. The ELDO lesson
demonstrates that the problem is difficult, not that it is impossible. The
difficulty of multilateral cooperation must be weighed against potential
political benefits, especially in the light of long-term needs for more
practical, efficient, and powerful international machinery.
Whatever the pattern that is followed, the possibilities for inter-
national space cooperation will grow, along with the proliferation of space
technology. It is eminently clear that both developments will open up new
political problems--and new opportunities--for the major space powers and
particularly for the United States.
